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1  Introduction
South Africa is one of the most naturally beautiful and ethnically diverse 
countries in the world. It is this beauty and the multicultural diversity1 of its 
society that has garnished it the title “the rainbow nation”.2 One could argue 
that diversity has become the norm in South Africa.3 South African society 
is further characterised by a stark disparity in the social and economic classes 
of its residents. It has been reported that Oxfam’s 2017 inequality report 
measured the total net wealth of just three billionaires in South Africa as 
equivalent to that of the bottom 50% of the country’s population, making South 
Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world.4 Millions of people 
live in poverty,5 and while the wealthy have many options to enforce the 
laws safeguarding their rights, the indigent are hard-pressed for opportunities 
for legal recourse in their so-called “poverty law” matters.6 Hence, there 
are those citizens of the rainbow nation who urgently require the services 
of legal professionals and organisations who specialise in these poverty law 
areas. These organisations serve as crucial enforcers of the rights of those who 
are unable to afford private legal representation. Legal aid providers, like the 
Stellenbosch University Law Clinic (“the Clinic”), have accordingly taken up 
the responsibility to represent the interests of the vulnerable. 
1 Google lists 34 ethnic groups who call South Africa their home. See, <https://www.google.co.za/search?q= 
What+are+the+ethnicities+in+South+Africa%3F&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwis6f3BkO7YAhVEVhQKHU
BfA2oQzmcIbw&biw=1920&bih=963> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
2 A term which was reportedly coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu to describe South African society 
post-Apartheid. See, eg, S Kellerman “The Rainbow Nation” (23-07-2014) Dreams to Reality <http://
www.dreamstoreality.co.za/the-rainbow-nation/> (accessed 13-03-2018) and Our Africa “Welcome to 
South Africa” (undated) Our Africa <http://www.our-africa.org/south-africa> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
3 A Versi “South Africa: A Treasure Trove of Diversity” (11-05-2017) New African <http://
newafricanmagazine.com/south-africa-treasure-trove-diversity/> (accessed 13-03-2018).
4 G Quintal “SA’s Rich-Poor Gap is Far Worse than Feared, Says Oxfam Inequality Report” (16-01-2017) 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-01-16-sas-rich-poor-gap-is-far-worse-than-feared-
says-oxfam-inequality-report/> (accessed 13-03-2018).
5 Statistics South Africa “Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty Between 
2006 & 2015” (08-2017) Stats SA <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10341> (accessed 13-03-2018). 55,5% 
(30,4 million) of the South African population lived in poverty in 2015. “The number of persons living in 
extreme poverty (i.e. persons living below the 2015 Food Poverty Line of R441 per person per month) in 
South Africa increased … to 13,8 million in 2015.”
6 S van der Merwe “Failure to discharge. A discussion of the insufficient legal recourse afforded to 
judgment debtors in the South African context” (2008) JJS 71 72.
In this context, poverty law thus refers to the practice of those matters 
where the rights of financially distressed citizens are at issue, for example 
those being evicted, or dismissed. Another area of poverty law lies in 
assisting the often-indigent judgment debtor when the judgment debt is 
enforced through improper or illegal collection methods. In practice, this is 
quite frequently done through the legal mechanism of emolument attachment 
orders (“EAOs”),7 sometimes also referred to as garnishee orders.8 Some of 
the cruelties, which have been committed against the South African people 
by unscrupulous moneylenders and collection agents who abuse the tenuous 
EAO legal system, have been well exposed in recent years.9 
On 13 September 2016, the South African Constitutional Court delivered 
its landmark judgment in University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; Association of Debt Recovery 
Agents NPC v Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v Clinic (“University of 
Stellenbosch”).10 This judgment has changed the legal landscape with regard 
to EAOs. In the wake of this now well-known and well-publicised judgment, 
the Clinic has continued to receive considerable numbers of requests for 
related legal aid, having assisted numerous clients to oppose illegal EAOs in 
the last decade or more.
In my capacity as senior attorney at the Clinic, I have extensive experience 
representing debtors in rescission of judgment and EAO cases and my 
practice and research in this regard assisted in framing the Applicant’s case in 
University of Stellenbosch. I also previously published on the insufficient legal 
recourse available to judgment debtors in South Africa,11 which publication 
in many respects served as a precursor to the issues that were before the 
court in University of Stellenbosch. It is this direct personal and professional 
involvement in the matter at hand, which brings a unique perspective to this 
discourse on the work of the Clinic (or Legal Aid Clinic as it was known at 
the time of the case).12 
This article will accordingly investigate and discuss the current South 
African legal landscape pertaining to the use of EAOs post University of 
Stellenbosch. This will be done by considering the factual background and 
7 The definition of emoluments attachment orders is apparent from their function, which is explained in 
section 65J of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944: 
“(1)(b) An emoluments attachment order–
  (i)  shall attach the emoluments at present or in future owing or accruing to the judgment debtor by or 
from his or her employer (in this section called the garnishee), to the amount necessary to cover the 
judgment and the costs of the attachment … and
  (ii)  shall oblige the garnishee to pay from time to time to the judgment creditor or his or her attorney 
specific amounts out of the emoluments of the judgment debtor …”
8 There is a slight, but important difference between garnishee orders, a term used to describe an order 
that empowers the creditor to attach any debt owed to the debtor by any third party, and EAOs, which are 
specific forms of garnishee orders applicable to the employer-employee relationship.
9 See, eg, Van der Merwe (2008) JJS; C Gardner “The complexity of emolument attachment orders” (2007) 
1 HR Highway 21; D James “Deductions and counter-deductions in South Africa” (2017) 7 HAU 281.
10 2016 6 SA 596 (CC).
11 Van der Merwe (2008) JJS.
12 Through the years, many diligent members of the Clinic’s staff contributed to the work and success of 
the impact litigation regarding EAOs. I would however be remiss not to single out Ms Mathilda Rosslee, 
Clinic paralegal at the time of the case, who became the face of the Clinic to many of the effected clients 
with whom she consulted on the matter. 
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events leading up to the initial Cape High Court13 and later Constitutional 
Court cases, followed by a short summation of the most important sections of 
the judgments. The article will then consider the impact and significance of 
the two cases before identifying the issues that remained unresolved.
2  Factual background
It is common knowledge that bad debt affects the lives of millions of people 
in South Africa. Billions of rands are at issue,14 and where such enormous 
amounts of money are at stake, there will always be an industry looking to 
cash in on the spoils. In any industry there are, unfortunately, likely to be an 
element of participants who look to do so in unscrupulous ways. One could 
argue that the proportion of this opportunistically dishonest element, and the 
influence which they are able to wield, is amplified with increased enticement 
in the form of large sums of money and a fragile legislative framework.15 In 
years past, these opportunities for substantial dishonest gains, by manipulating 
the questionable legal system, have been abundant in the South African credit 
industry.
At the Clinic, we became aware of the epidemic proportion of these 
abuses, which were perpetrated by creditors in the small cash loan industry, 
through our representation of debtors who were struggling to make ends meet 
after their modest salaries had been garnished through EAOs. Since 2001, 
the Clinic has brought dozens of applications to rescind or reduce illegal or 
unjustified EAOs.16 In some of these cases, clients were granted loans that 
were practically impossible to repay due to the lending agent withholding 
information from the debtors or relocating their offices without informing 
the debtor accordingly.17 In many cases laypersons and debtors who were 
unschooled and barely literate were required to sign blank documents, which 
were occasionally found to be abused to enter more than one judgment and 
resulting EAO based on the same cause of action.18 Consents to judgments and 
EAOs, which were frequently signed on a fraudulent basis, were particularly 
disposed to abuse. These judgments and resulting EAOs were often entered 
against debtors from magistrates’ courts thousands of kilometres away from 
their residence and place of employment in order to frustrate the debtor’s 
13 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC).
14 During the Western Cape High Court case of University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of 
Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC), affidavits were filed on behalf of the seventeenth respondent, Flemix & 
Associates, which disclosed that they represent (only) 45 credit providers with 150 000 active cases, 
totalling a book value of R1 597 585 832 (over one and a half billion rand). In his minority judgment (para 
6) in University of Stellenbosch, Jafta J referred to evidence on affidavit stating that the credit industry 
“supported 20 million credit consumers out of a population of 52 million. At the time the total debtors’ 
book was estimated at R1.47 trillion, of which R168 billion comprised unsecured debts.”
15 See, eg, the 1 March 2013 press release of the Law Society of South Africa where the society 
states, with regard to EAOs, that “[t]he system is open to abuse because the law is weak”. B Whittle 
“Law Society Condemns Abuse of Garnishee System” (01-03-2013) Law Society of South Africa <http://
www.lssa.org.za/upload/documents/LSSA%20Press%20garnishees%20%2001_%2003_13.pdf.> 
(accessed 13-03-2018).
16 See, eg, specific cases described in Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 74–75.
17 74–75.
18 74.
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attempts to combat them.19 A further recurring issue was that the applicable 
legislation20 allowed these orders to be granted by clerks of the court who 
merely rubberstamped the creditor’s version and biddings, without proper 
judicial oversight.21 Even in those cases where the underlying merit and 
the process in obtaining the judgment was sound, we found that the size of 
the monthly instalments were completely disproportionate to the debtor’s 
monthly salary.22 Arguably, the biggest concern however was the total lack of 
transparency and discharge when the debtor’s salary had been garnished to the 
point where the judgment debt, along with fair interest and costs, had already 
been collected. We assisted clients whose salaries had already been garnished 
by ten times the initial loan amount, while the creditors were adamant that the 
debtor then still owed seven times the initial loan amount before the account 
could be finalised.23 
During this time, the Clinic was not the only organisation actively raising 
awareness of the wide-scale abuses in the EAO system. Reports started filtering 
in from the public media sector that supported the findings of the Clinic,24 and 
there was even some academic attention directed at the matter.25 Other service 
providers entered the fray and conducted their own audits of the situation, 
yielding yet more disturbing findings.26 These investigations confirmed that 
debtors were often found to be victims of fraudulent misrepresentations with 
regard to the scope and content of loan agreements and that multiple EAOs 
were issued based on one judgment. They found regular instances of illegal 
collection costs, which were unilaterally charged to accounts, and instances 
of credit balances being transferred to “unclaimed balances” accounts before 
being written off.27 
For a while there was hope that all this attention would spark a dramatic 
intervention by the powers that be. Additionally, one may have assumed that 
the creditors who were guilty of these abuses would, by their own volition, 
initiate remedial action. However, as time passed, it became clear that neither 
was forthcoming. It seemed that the entire matter would simply peter out as 
the proverbial storm in a teacup, leaving legal aid organisations fighting a lone 
battle on a case-by-case basis. 
19 74–75.
20 Section 65J of the MCA.
21 Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 76-77.
22 74–75.
23 74.
24 See Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 75, where reference is made to articles in Die Kaapse Son and television 
broadcasts on Carte Blanche.
25 A conference paper on the topic was delivered by S van der Merwe during the 5th International Journal 
of Clinical Legal Education Conference, held in Johannesburg from 9 to 11 July 20017; van der Merwe 
(2008) JJS; F Haupt, H Coetzee, D de Villiers & J Fouché The incidence of and the undesirable practices 
relating to garnishee orders in South Africa (2008) University of Pretoria Law Clinic Published Report.
26 See Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 76: 
“Mr Clark Gardner of Summit Financial Partners audited 70 000 of the 1,75 million garnishee orders 
that have been set in motion by South African Courts. According to him the system is riddled with 
abuse. ‘If we had to extrapolate our audit findings there must be over a billion rand being over-deducted 
from already distressed borrowers and going into the pockets of unscrupulous lenders and collectors 
alike.’” [footnotes omitted].
27 75-76.
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Then, on 16 August 2012, something tragic happened which put the 
spotlight squarely and (one would think) irrevocably on the abuses of the EAO 
collection system: the Marikana massacre. South African police forces shot 
and killed 34 striking mineworkers outside the Lonmin platinum mine in the 
North West province. The strike and ensuing violence was a direct result of the 
miners’ desperation to have their economic needs, and that of their families, 
properly considered. 28 They were adamant that their salaries were insufficient 
to cater to their basic needs, and in the investigations that followed, it became 
clear that there were, in fact, strong linkages to reckless lending:
“Many of these miners are left with scarcely enough money to cover their basic living expenses, after 
their monthly instalments have been deducted from their accounts. In fact, miner indebtedness has 
been quoted as one of the key causal factors of the notoriously violent Marikana strikes in 2012.”29
If anything positive could be said to come from such a devastating tragedy, 
at least it seemed that some influential role-players were now starting 
to appreciate the seriousness of the issue. Soon after the tragedy, the then 
Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa (“BASA”) issued a joint statement stating, inter alia, that: “BASA 
members commit not to use garnishee orders against credit defaulters, as they 
believe the use of such orders for credit is inappropriate”.30 This victory for the 
debtor was short lived, as it soon emerged that the sentiment expressed in this 
statement after Marikana was disingenuous: the banks continued using EAOs 
pending the availability of “alternative tools”.31 During 2013 the then Minister 
of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, stated that “[w]e are concerned by the abuse of 
emolument attachment orders that has left many workers without money to 
live on after they have serviced their debts every month”.32 In the same year an 
Emolument Attachment Order Task Team met under the guidance of the Credit 
Ombud, and reported that it “submitted a well-rounded document to National 
Treasury” with the view of establishing a code of conduct for the industry.33 
Treasury responded by issuing a media statement entitled “Government moves 
to protect consumers and assist over-indebted households”, in which it listed 
“preventative steps to minimise the risk of over-indebtedness” and also listed 
ways in which Government was “considering” assisting households ensnared 
by debt. The statement ends by informing the reader that “[t]he Ministers of 
28 South African History Online “Marikana Massacre 16 August 2012” (16-08-2017) South African History 
Online <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012> (accessed 13-03-2018).
29 Reckless Lending “NCR Accuses Ubank of Reckless Lending” (22-05-2015) Reckless Lending <http://
reckless-lending.co.za/ncr-accuses-ubank-of-reckless-lending/> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
30 Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South Africa 
“Ensuring Responsible Market Conduct for Bank Lending” (01-11-2012) National Treasury <http://www.
treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf> (accessed 13-03-2018). The statement, which 
was signed on behalf of the six major banks in South Africa, was “a consequence of a meeting that took 
place between the above-mentioned parties on 19 October 2012, which built on commitments that were 
made during a previous consultation between the Finance Minister and major retail bank chief executives 
and chairperson on 27 August 2012.”
31 M Rees & J Clark “Banks backpedal on garnishees” (03-12-2012) Moneyweb <https://www.moneyweb.
co.za/archive/banks-backpedal-on-garnishees/> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
32 Minister of Finance P Gordhan “2013 Budget speech” (27-02-2013) National Treasury <http://www.
treasury.gov.za/documents/national budget/2013/speech/speech.pdf> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
33 M van Schalkwyk “Note from the Ombud” (04-09-2013) Credit Ombud <http://www.creditombud.org.
za/note-from-the-ombud-volume-5/> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
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Finance and Trade and Industry will develop a more detailed implementation 
framework next year”.34 There is however no indication that either the 
Credit Ombud Task Team report, nor the Treasury statement and promised 
implementation framework, came to any fruition.35 Proposed amendments to 
the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 (“MCA”) to curb the abuses associated 
with EAOs have been in the pipeline since 2013,36 but at the time of writing, 
these still have to be finalised by the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (“DJCD”).37 During March 2014, the DJCD sent a circular to 
all its offices in which it referred to the then recent media reports regarding 
illegal EAOs and reported that it had confirmed the existence of many of 
these abuses during an assessment conducted at Ermelo Magistrates’ Court 
on 19 February 2014. In terms of the circular, “it was found that thousands of 
consents … did not comply with the … act” and that certain provisions were 
“being acutely and severely abused by most micro lenders”.38
From the above brief exposition, it is clear that during the last decade a lot 
has been said, planned, and debated regarding the abuse-prone EAO legal 
framework; even more so in reaction to the Marikana tragedy. In addressing 
criticism levied against it, the Law Society of South Africa (“LSSA”) in 
its 1 March 2013 press release expressed the view many seemed to hold. It 
recognised “the severe impact of the abuse of emolument attachment orders”, 
but blamed the legislature and the courts for the problem.39 I argued before 
that one must question the political will to effect real change when there 
is limited means available in these poverty law issues.40 This argument is 
strengthened when all the attention to the EAO problem prior to 2015 yielded 
very little genuine impact. This was still the case when the Clinic decided to 
issue its application in the High Court of the Western Cape during September 
2014.
3  The High Court and Constitutional Court cases
On 8 July 2015, Desai J delivered judgment on case 16703/2014 in the 
Western Cape Division of the High Court of South Africa.41 The applicants 
had been the University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic (as it was known 
then), in its own as well as the public interest,42 and fifteen clients of the 
Clinic who brought the application to protect their own rights and interests. 
34 Minister of Finance, Trade and Industry “MEDIA STATEMENT: Government moves to protect 
consumers and assist over-indebted households” (12-12-2013) National Treasury <http://www.treasury.
gov.za/comm_media/press/2013/20131212%20-%20Household%20overindebtedness.pdf> (accessed 
13-03-2018).
35 S Ameermia “Garnishee Orders: A concerted effort required to tackle abuse of emolument attachment 
orders” (06-08-2015) The South African Human Rights Commission <https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.
php/sahrc-media/opinion-pieces/item/381-garnishee-orders> (accessed 13-03-2018). 
36 B Whittle “Law Society Condemns Abuse of Garnishee System” (01-03-2013) Law Society of South 
Africa.
37 See the text to part 4 below.
38 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Circular 30 of 2014. Copy on file with author.
39 B Whittle “Law Society Condemns Abuse of Garnishee System” (01-03-2013) Law Society of South Africa. 
40 Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 72-73.
41 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC).
42 In terms of ss 38(1)(a) and 38(1)(d) of the Constitution.
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The respondents were the State,43 a number of credit providers and collection 
agents and the Association of Debt Recovery Agents (“ADRA”). The South 
African Human Rights Commission (“HRC”) was admitted as amicus curiae. 
In light of the history of unregulated EAO abuses, the applicants sought 
legal relief in the form of declaratory orders to, firstly, declare certain 
sections44 of the MCA unconstitutional on the basis that they “fail to provide 
for judicial oversight over the issuing of an EAO against a judgment debtor”.45 
Secondly, the applicants sought an order to confirm that EAOs could not be 
issued “in jurisdictions alien to them on the basis that it was not permitted 
by legislation”.46 The applicants also averred that the EAOs issued against 
second to sixteenth applicants should be set aside based on this illegality.47
In his written judgment, Desai J emphasised the “[p]ivotal” role of written 
consents to judgment which were obtained from debtors.48 The severely 
and detrimentally wide ambit of these documents, which had supposedly 
been signed by the debtors themselves after having been fully informed of 
the content and consequences, exceeded reasonable expectations.49 It rather 
supported the applicants’ version that these consents were obtained on 
fraudulent grounds.50 The judge agreed that the signing circumstances of 
these documents were suspicious,51 and that the debt collecting agents, who 
worked on a “no trace no fee” basis, had a “vested interest” in the matters,52 
supporting the veracity of allegations regarding their unlawful practices. 
The judge concluded that it seemed that these consents “were signed neither 
voluntarily nor on an informed basis. Their validity was accordingly open 
to serious doubt”.53 The court also considered the validity of the initial 
loan agreements, which regularly included interest at 60% per annum and 
were concluded completely absent of, alternatively after severely defective, 
affordability assessments.54 These transactions were conducted in breach 
of section 81 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“NCA”), and therefore 
constituted reckless credit.55 
The court found “no sufficient reason” to justify the “unrestricted 
deprivation of a debtor’s earnings and means of support” due to a lack of 
any prescribed limit to the number of EAOs granted against debtors, and the 
43 The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, the Minister of Trade and Industry and the National 
Credit Regulator.
44 Sections 65J(2)(a), 65J(2)(b)(1) and 65J(ii) of the MCA.
45 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC) para 20.
46 Para 21. Applicants specifically sought a declaration that in proceedings brought by a judgment creditor 
for the enforcement of any credit agreement in which the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 applies, section 
45 of the MCA does not permit a judgment debtor to consent in writing to the jurisdiction of a magistrates’ 
court other than that in which the judgment debtor resides or is employed.
47 Para 22.
48 Para 23.
49 See paras 24, 31: “The suggestion that a debtor would willingly agree to an EAO in terms of which almost 
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amount(s) payable in terms of these.56 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
considered foreign law57 and international conventions like the International 
Labour Organisation’s Protection of Wages Convention and the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which highlighted 
the shortcomings in the South African system.58 Desai J also stressed the 
Constitutional Court’s emphasis on judicial oversight as “general principle” 
in cases where a person’s property is attached with the view of seizing it from 
them.59 He cited the judgments in the eminent cases of Chief Lesapo v The 
North West Agricultural Bank (“Lesapo”),60 Jaftha v Schoeman (“Jaftha”)61 
and Gundwana v Steko Development CC (“Gundwana”),62 which all 
confirmed that a lack of judicial supervision in these circumstances infringes 
on the debtor’s constitutional rights. The court concluded that “[i]n the light of 
the obvious similarities, the arguments for judicial oversight in Lesapo, Jaftha 
and Gundwana apply with equal force to the issuance of EAOs”.63
The judge therefore opined that the consequences of EAOs have a “direct 
impact” on several constitutionally enshrined rights, like the right to shelter 
and human dignity.64 The court is obviously very protective of every 
citizen’s right of access to courts,65 and heavily criticised the respondents’ 
modus operandi of “forum shopping” and “navigating around” jurisdictions 
of courts, which are accessible to the debtor and their employer, in favour 
of courts that have no jurisdiction and are far removed from the debtor’s 
influence.66 The judge noted that when pressed on the issue, respondents 
conceded that the relevant EAOs, which were granted by irregular courts, 
were in fact unlawful.67
In consideration of the above, the court ordered that the EAOs issued against 
the second to sixteenth applicants “are declared to be unlawful, invalid and 
of no force and effect”.68 The court granted the applicants’ requested relief 
in so far as that section 65J(2) of the MCA was declared unconstitutional to 
the extent that it allowed for the issuing of EAOs without judicial oversight.69 
The court also agreed that, in matters falling under the auspices of the NCA, 
consent to the jurisdiction of courts alien to the debtor was not permitted.70 
In addition, the court took proactive steps in ordering the first to third 
respondents, the HRC, the LSSA and the advice offices, to take steps to ensure 
56 Para 39.
57 See paras 42-49. The court considered five jurisdictions; the United States of America, Germany, 
Australia, Rwanda and England and Whales, who all impose some limit or cap to the legally attachable 
amount of a debtor’s monthly salary.
58 Paras 67-74.
59 Para 76.
60 2000 1 SA 409 (CC).
61 2005 2 SA 140 (CC).
62 2011 3 SA 608 (CC).
63 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC) para 81.
64 Paras 40-41.
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that debtors are informed of their rights, and it ordered the Law Society of the 
Northern Province to investigate the conduct of the seventeenth respondent71 
for unethical behaviour.72 
Because it ruled on the constitutional validity of the relevant legislation in 
its judgment, the Constitutional Court had to confirm the order made by the 
High Court of South Africa before it had any force.73 After having heard the 
matter on 3 March 2016, the Constitutional Court delivered its judgment in 
University of Stellenbosch on 13 September 2016.74 
In his 127 paragraph minority judgment,75 Jafta J presented a thorough 
exposition of the state of the credit industry in South Africa, as well as the 
historic development of the current legislative framework which regulates 
it.76 In doing so, he made a considerable effort to juxtapose sections 129 and 
130 of the NCA with sections 57 and 58 of the MCA in arguing (obiter) that 
the latter sections run afoul of the NCA and, importantly, of section 34 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”),77 in 
denying debtors judicial oversight before granting judgment against them.78 
Jafta J also specifically surveyed the legal framework that underpins the 
execution and collection process.79 He referred to Lesapo in considering “the 
relationship between a judicial process and execution”,80 and was firm in his 
conclusion that “[t]here can be no execution without a judicial process as a 
prelude”.81 The judge then discussed the undisputed facts of the case of just 
one of the applicants,82 identified the issues and summarised the litigation 
and High Court order which led to the current matter.83
Jafta J then engaged with the first question before him, namely whether the 
declaration of invalidity of section 65J(2) of the MCA should be confirmed.84 
In investigating the issue, he opined that the court should enquire whether the 
order was “properly made” (in so far as “the impugned provision unjustifiably 
limits rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights”),85 and not just concern 
itself with the fervour of the respondents’ objection thereto.86 The succinct 
question was whether the disputed sections failed to provide for judicial 
oversight in granting the EAOs, and if so, whether that failure constituted a 
71 Flemix & Associates Incorporated.
72 Orders 4 and 8.
73 Sections 167(5) and 172(2) of the Constitution.
74 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; Association 
of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) 
Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 2016 6 SA 596 (CC).
75 Paras 1-127.
76 Paras 6-40.









86 Paras 69 and 72. Jafta J notes that the parties agreed on the issue of invalidity of the relevant provisions, 
but maintained that such a concession would not hinder the court’s duty to determine unconstitutionality.
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breach of section 34 of the Constitution.87 After defining the phrase “judicial 
oversight”,88 the judge sought to interpret the relevant section in line with the 
principle that supports an interpretation granting provisions “a meaning that 
preserves its validity”.89 Applying this method, the learned judge reasoned 
that a correct interpretation and application of section 65J of the MCA in fact 
required judicial oversight, which left no room for clerks of the court to issue 
EAOs.90 Any different interpretation, as was accepted by the High Court and 
is followed in the majority judgment in University of Stellenbosch, resulted 
from a “widespread incorrect application” of this section, which necessitated 
the court to make a declaration that only a court can issue EAOs.91 In the 
premise, the judge refused to uphold the High Court’s order of invalidity.92
In turning to the second question, Jafta J then considered the respondents’ 
appeal against the High Court’s order 
“that in proceedings brought by a creditor for the enforcement of any credit agreement to which the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 . . . applies, section 45 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act does not permit 
a debtor to consent in writing to the jurisdiction of a magistrates’ court other than that in which that 
debtor resides or is employed.”93 
The judge dismissed the respondents’ “clever argument”,94 which was 
designed to dismantle the prohibition that NCA sections 90 and 91 place 
on the extension of jurisdiction to alien courts, as allowed by MCA section 
45, finding that the latter is in fact “limit[ed]” by the relevant provisions of 
the NCA.95 The judge also dismissed the respondents’ argument that this 
prohibition breached the party’s section 34 right of access to courts, finding 
this argument unfairly stacked in favour of the creditor to the detriment of the 
debtor.96
In delivering the concise majority judgment97 Cameron J disagreed with 
Jafta J’s broad approach, and affirmed the High Court’s credence that judicial 
oversight should also apply to the execution process.98 The judge agreed with 
Desai J that a lack of judicial oversight posed a threat to constitutional guarantees 
like the right of access to courts as well as “the livelihood and dignity of low-
income earners”.99 Cameron J rejected the argument that the abuse of section 
65J could be attributed solely to a “widespread incorrect practical application 
of the provision”100 as it failed to provide for orders granted by the clerk of the 
court. Instead, the judge argued that in circumstances where the EAO was 
87 Para 71.
88 In para 74: “‘judicial oversight’ was defined in Jaftha by this Court as denoting a decision by a court, 
following a consideration of relevant facts”.
89 See para 76 and authority quoted therein.
90 Paras 77-109.
91 Para 93.
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based on the debtor’s consent, the MCA provided for exactly this mechanism 
(in other words “judicially unsanctioned execution”).101 In his concurring 
judgment, Zondo J elaborated on the appropriate remedy that the court should 
award under the circumstances.102 He opined that although the imputed MCA 
section was in essence invalid, the High Court’s “order of notional severance” 
was inappropriate. The judge’s view was that the problem was rather one of 
“omission”, in as much as “[w]hat is constitutionally offensive is the absence 
in section 65J(2)(a) of words requiring judicial oversight before the issuing of 
an emoluments attachment order when the judgment debtor has consented 
thereto in writing”.103 The appropriate remedy was therefore “reading-in”,104 
and the court accordingly avoided confirming the High Court’s order of 
constitutional invalidity, but rather ordered a change in the wording of section 
65J of the MCA to make it consistent with section 34 of the Constitution. In 
dismissing the appeals from the High Court, the Constitutional Court also 
upheld the High Court’s order that, for the purposes of issuing EAOs, section 
45 of the MCA did not permit a debtor to consent in writing to the jurisdiction 
of a magistrates’ court other than where they reside and/or work.
In reaching its decision, it is important to note that the Constitutional 
Court also grappled with the question of whether the order should apply 
retrospectively, or only prospectively. Cameron J indicated that affected 
debtors would receive the benefit of the High Court’s order immediately, from 
the date of that order.105 The judge listed the arguments of both applicants 
and respondents,106 and was swayed by the latter’s insistence that the matter 
was one of “considerable complexity, best regulated by the Legislature”.107 
Zondo J agreed.108 As a result, the court in University of Stellenbosch issued 
a prospective order only.
4  Significance of the judgments
The Desai judgment in the Western Cape High Court had an immediate 
impact on the credit industry and the EAO environment. Shortly after its 
release, the DJCD issued a short media statement109 in which the Department 
referred to the judgment and warned creditors to abide by the “sentiments” 
expressed therein. Practically, this meant ensuring that future EAOs were 
obtained legally and that any that had been effected illegally in the past, were 
rescinded. Significantly, the DJCD encouraged employers to get involved in 
their employees’ financial wellbeing. They advised employers to “approach 
the clerks of the courts where the EAOs originated to ensure that judgment 








108 Para 211. 
109 On 20 July 2015.
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to EAOs and whether he or she can afford another deduction”.110 The 
statement also indicated that the department was “finalizing a Magistrates’ 
Courts Amendment Bill in an attempt to curb the abuses of the debt recovery 
procedure system”.111 As a result, the Courts Of Law Amendment Bill112 was 
introduced to the National Assembly on 11 May 2016.113 
After 13 September 2016, efforts to enact legislation to address EAO abuses 
were certainly bolstered by the Constitutional Court’s directive to change the 
wording of the relevant provisions of the MCA. In his judgment, Cameron J 
noted that the DJCD in fact indicated that “legislation is pending to address 
the abuse of emoluments attachment orders”, and that this Bill had already 
been circulating in its second draft.114 Consequently, the President signed and 
assented to the Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017 (“CLA”) on 31 July 
2017, which Act came into operation on 2 August 2018. It is envisaged that the 
CLA will have a significant impact on the EAO legal landscape as its stated 
purpose clearly indicates its goal to amend all the most important provisions 
applicable to the debt collection process, including those relevant to EAOs.115 
I am delighted with the CLA’s addition to the MCA in the form of the 
new section 36(3),116 as this will now allow for the discharge of judgments in 
circumstances where the debt, legal interest and costs have been paid in full.117 
As previously argued,118 the existing framework under the MCA affords 
insufficient legal recourse to judgment debtors who are in this position. It 
creates an untenable diversity in discretion in the judgments of magistrates 
whose subjective legal findings have far-reaching consequences for already 
distressed borrowers. This situation could ultimately only be alleviated by 
110 [Own emphasis]. Ministry of Justice and Correctional Services “Justice Department Finalising its 
Magistrate Courts Bill to Curb Debt Abuse” (20-07-2015) Department: Justice and Constitutional 
Development <http://www.justice.gov.za/m_statements/2015/20150720-DebtAbuse.html> (accessed 
14-03-2018).
111 Ministry of Justice and Correctional Services “Justice Department Finalising its Magistrate Courts Bill 
to Curb Debt Abuse” Department: Justice and Constitutional Development.
112 [B8 – 2016].
113 Parliamentary Monitoring Group “Courts of Law Amendment Bill (B6-2016)” (2017) Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group <https://pmg.org.za/bill/643/> (accessed 14-03-2018).
114 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; Association 
of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v Clinic 2016 6 SA 596 (CC) para 
158.
115 The purpose of the Act will be 
“[t]o amend the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944, so as to insert definitions; to regulate the rescission of 
judgments where the judgment debt has been paid; to further regulate jurisdiction by consent of parties; 
to regulate the factors a court must take into consideration to make a just and equitable order; to further 
regulate the payment of debts in instalments or otherwise; to further regulate consent to judgments and 
orders for the payment of judgment debts in instalments; to further regulate offers by judgment debtors 
after judgment; to further regulate the issuing of emoluments attachment orders; to further regulate 
debt collection proceedings pursuant to judgments granted by a court for a regional division; to further 
regulate the suspension of execution of a debt; to further regulate the abandonment of judgments; and 
to provide for certain offences and penalties relating to judgments, emoluments attachment orders 
and instalment orders; to amend the Superior Courts Act, 2013, so as to provide for the rescission of 
judgments by consent and the rescission of judgments where the judgment debt has been paid; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.”
116 Section 2 of the CLA.
117 The judgment may be rescinded on application (which may be heard by the magistrate in chambers) in the 
prescribed form by the debtor or any affected person.
118 Van der Merwe (2008) JJS.
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legislative amendment.119 The insertion will therefore fill a serious lacuna in 
the South African legal system, and bring about legal certainty in an area 
where it is most needed.120 A further welcome addition engineered by the 
CLA is that of MCA section 45(3),121 which will, in accordance with the orders 
of court discussed above,122 explicitly outlaw relevant consents to extend 
jurisdictions to courts who have no section 28 jurisdiction over the debtor.123 
The CLA also adds additional safeguards, inter alia with regard to the NCA, 
that have to be in place for debtors to enter admissions of liability and consent 
to judgments in terms of MCA sections 57 and 58.124 
The CLA inserts125 a new section 55A, applicable to the provisions of 
chapters 8126 and 9127 of the MCA. This section radically extends the scope 
of factors which the court has to take into consideration in awarding EAOs. 
In terms of current legislation the court’s enquiry is limited to the “nature” 
of the debtor’s income and the amount of, firstly, “necessary expenses” to 
maintain themselves and their dependents and, secondly, required to pay other 
obligations “in terms of an order of court”.128 Under the CLA, the court would 
also have to consider various other factors to determine whether such an 
order would be “just and equitable”.129 These factors include a wide range of 
considerations including the size and history of the debt, the debtor’s personal 
circumstances, as well as broad social justice concerns.130 
It is likely in the application of this new section 55A within the ambit of 
section 65, which deals with offers by judgment debtors post judgment, where 
the CLA’s impact will be most profound.131 Akin, as is the case with sections 
57 and 58, orders in terms of section 65 will also be more cumbersome 
for creditors to come by. The provisions of the CLA leave no doubt that a 
magistrate, and not a clerk, will in future only issue an EAO after considering 
a debtor’s circumstances and determining the monthly deductions to be 
119 84.
120 77-82.
121 Section 3 of the CLA.
122 See the text to part 3 above.
123 In terms of s 28(1)(a) of the MCA this includes, inter alia, “[a]ny person who resides, carries on business 
or is employed within the district or regional division”.
124 Sections 5-6 of the CLA.
125 Section 4.
126 Chapter VIII – Recovery of debts (ss 55-60).
127 Chapter IX – Execution (ss 61-79).
128 MCA s 65D(4)(a).
129 Section 4 of the CLA.
130 The relevant factors are listed as 
“the size of the debt; the circumstances in which the debt arose; the availability of alternatives to 
recover the debt; the interests of the plaintiff or judgment creditor; the rights and needs of the elderly, 
children, persons with disabilities and households headed by women; social values and implications; 
the amount and nature of the defendant’s or judgment debtor’s income; the amounts needed by the 
defendant or judgment debtor for necessary expenses and those of the persons dependent on him or her 
and for the making of periodical payments which he or she is obliged to make in terms of an order of 
court, agreement or otherwise in respect of his or her other commitments; and whether the order would, 
in the circumstances of the case, be grossly disproportionate.’’
131 Sections 7-9 of the CLA.
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“appropriate” and the order to be “just and equitable”.132 Importantly, the CLA 
inserts a new section,133 which will limit the total instalment amount that can 
be deducted in terms of one or more EAOs to 25% of the debtor’s basic gross 
monthly salary.134 This is also a significant development in an environment 
where allegations are rife that creditors currently abuse EAOs to deduct 50% 
or more from some unfortunate debtors’ salaries.135
The above legislative improvements are essential. They will give effect 
to the most important orders of court and will improve the plight of future 
debtors who run afoul of unscrupulous creditors and collection agencies. But, 
to quote Desai J, “[t]hat, however, is not the end of this matter”.136 There are 
undoubtedly tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, maybe even 
millions, of debtors who are victims of existing dubious EAOs. This was 
exactly Desai J’s concern when he expanded his order to require compliance 
from more than just the legislative authority. Noting the seventeenth 
respondent’s statement that they manage more than 150 000 active cases, and 
on the “safe” assumption that many more debtors are being abused, Desai J 
ordered pro-active steps since one “cannot in good conscience ignore their 
plight”.137 The hope is that the investigations and interventions required from 
the first to the third respondents, the HRC, the LSSA and the advice offices, 
would serve to secure the interests of the public at large.138
The overall significance and influence of these two judgments are 
tremendous, specifically with regard to the implication of the judicial oversight 
and access to justice (through access to approachable courts) which is required 
in terms thereof. These measures have served to bring the relevant provisions 
of the MCA in line with our constitutional dispensation and to combat the 
exploitation of poor people. It is therefore not far-fetched to argue that it has 
reduced the risk of more tragedies such as Marikana occurring in the future. 
It undoubtedly softened the negative social and economic impact of unlawful 
collections.139 One could also argue that the influence of the judgments has 
already filtered down to the man on the street, and has played a pivotal role 
in the marked decrease in judgments regarding debt matters.140 Whether the 
judgments have however succeeded in causing a complete turnaround in the 
bad debt and credit industry, is a question that is still up for debate.
132 The CLA confirms repeatedly that enquiries should be made in order to only award EAOs “after satisfying 
itself that it is just and equitable that an emoluments attachment order be issued and that the amount is 
appropriate”. See ss 7-9.
133 Section 65J(1A) of the MCA.
134 Section 9 of the CLA.
135 See, eg, para 33 of the judgment of Desai J in University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of 
Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC).
136 Para 65.
137 Para 66.
138 See orders 4 and 8.
139 As discussed in, inter alia, Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 84-85.
140 Statistics South Africa “Indebted South Africans Showing Resilience?” (21-04-2016) Statistics South 
Africa <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=6437.> (accessed 15-03-2018). 
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5  Evaluation and unresolved issues
This article endeavoured to describe the background and run-up to the recent 
prominent EAO High Court and Constitutional Court cases involving the 
Stellenbosch University Legal Aid Clinic (as it then was). It also discussed the 
respective judgments and considered the significance of each. In conclusion, it 
is sensible to evaluate the efficacy of the judgments in considering the current 
EAO legal landscape. In the process, certain as yet unresolved issues will be 
identified and contemplated.
I have previously asserted141 that one of the main problems with our EAO 
system is the fraudulent acquisition of judgments and resulting EAOs, which 
are often based on illegal consents and a blatant abuse of process. Clerks, 
without any judicial oversight, issued EAOs from incorrect jurisdictions. 
The abuse extended to the period after the EAOs were awarded, when it 
transpired that creditors made unilateral amendments to increase repayments 
due to illegal autonomously charged costs and interest. As a result, exorbitant 
amounts were charged which were completely disproportionate to the debtor’s 
income.142 Reviewing and rescinding these EAOs proved highly problematic 
due to a system that seemed to be geared to benefit the creditor exclusively, 
to the severe detriment of the debtor.143 This abuse was possible due to a lack 
of numeracy-, literacy- and legal skills on the part of unqualified clerks of the 
court. A frail legislative framework fuelled a manipulable general process 
and placed undue reliance on the creditor’s bona fides, both before and after 
judgment. This, along with creditors’ unscrupulous attitudes and questionable 
political will to bring about real change, must be factored in as causes for this 
situation.144 I made suggestions elsewhere to address these issues.145 
One must keep in mind that University of Stellenbosch did not attempt to 
outlaw the use of EAOs, simply because of their abuse. As long as they are 
enforced in a legally responsible manner, EAOs undeniably have an important 
role to play in the country’s debt recovery system. The judgment also does not 
affect the validity of the underlying judgment debt. Debtors should, of course, 
be expected to pay what is legally due, also by means of collection through legal 
EAOs. In determining the amount of this indebtedness as well as the extent of 
the collection method, one should however abide by the prevailing legislation, 
including the provisions of the NCA with regard to sanctions on creditors 
due to the granting of reckless credit.146 It is in this regard that the impact of 
the two EAO judgments will be most profound: they have manufactured a 
dramatic legislative amendment. In terms of the CLA, Magistrates’ Courts 
are bound to the precedent of the High Court and Constitutional Court in their 
application of EAO processes. As a result, creditors will find it even more 
difficult to repeat the abuses of the past as discussed above. 





146 See Part D for regulations concerning over-indebtedness and reckless credit. 
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That is all good and well for EAO matters after 8 July 2015, but what about 
the countless number of EAOs that have been pursued illegally prior to this 
date? The Constitutional Court clearly indicated that the judicial oversight and 
jurisdictional prudence demanded in terms of the High Court’s order are only 
effective from the date of issue thereof.147 The amendments to the legislation, 
which give effect to the judgments, will only be valid prospectively.148 
Cameron J acknowledged the difficulty of this finding in his judgment, stating 
that “the grievous effect of this [issuing a prospective order only] is that past 
emoluments attachment orders, unscrupulously procured or issued, will 
continue to be operative, unless individually challenged”.149 The difficulties 
inherent to righting the wrongs of the past in these individual challenges have 
already been mentioned earlier in this article, and the situation is exasperated 
by the reality that orders awarded by practically inaccessible courts are 
not rescinded mero motu. The 20 July 2015 media statement by the DJCD 
confirmed as much, when employers are told to refer EAOs to the clerks of 
the courts “where the EAOs originated” to verify their validity.150 The CLA 
does not seem to contain any provision that will address this specific concern 
either.151
A further unresolved issue is the result of the investigation that the Law 
Society of the Northern Province was ordered to conduct into the affairs of 
the seventeenth respondent in the High Court matter.152 Although a copy of 
the proceedings, along with a letter requesting compliance with the order, was 
forwarded to the Law Society of the Northern Provinces on 16 July 2015,153 
no satisfactory answer has been forthcoming, and it seems that the particular 
collection agents are still conducting business as usual.154 The same concern 
presents itself with regard to the second order of Desai J that was aimed at 
mobilising the legal fraternity to alert debtors to their rights in terms of the 
judgment. Very little seems to have been done in this regard, and the Clinic 
has recently addressed correspondence to the various organisations listed in 
the order to enquire as to their efforts during the more than two year period 
since the judgment was delivered.155
A further important unresolved issue requires attention. Due to the 
collections processes facilitated by unlawful EAOs, it has been estimated that 
147 Some have argued that the 28 July 2014 amendment of the Magistrates’ Court Act Rules have outlawed 
EAOs granted without judicial oversight after that date. See, eg, Bregman Moodley Attorneys Inc. “When 
an Emolument Attachment Order (or Garnishee) Order is Invalid” Bregman Moodley Attorneys Inc. 
<https://www.bregmans.co.za/when-an-emolument-attachment-or-garnishee-order-is-invalid/> (accessed 
15-03-2018). It is unclear what specific rule amendment(s) are relied on to substantiate this argument, and 
it is even less convincing in light of Cameron J’s assertion in para 154 of University of Stellenbosch Legal 
Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v 
Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v Clinic 2016 6 SA 596 (CC). 
148 Paras 159 and 211.
149 Para 159.
150 See the text to part 4 above.
151 Para 9 of the CLA still requires the court that issued the EAO, to adjudicate on its continued validity in 
terms of the amended s 65J(6) and (7) of the MCA.
152 Order 4 in University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice 2015 5 SA 221 (WCC).
153 Correspondence on file with author.
154 Flemix and Associates Incorporated <https://www.flemixinc.co.za/> (accessed 15-03-2018).
155 Correspondence on file with author.
92 STELL LR 2019 1
“there must be over a billion rand” illegally deducted from employee salaries 
and paid to dishonest creditors and their collection agents.156 How will these 
debtors be assisted and empowered to recover these amounts? There is no clear 
indication in the two judgments, and there does not appear to be any relevant 
precedent in our law. Debtors who are desirous to take action in this regard are 
further hamstrung by several practical considerations. Most notably, how will 
they establish and then prove the quantum of their claim? In my experience, 
when pressed about the extent of deductions by manner of EAOs, attorneys 
for the creditors typically produce several pages of bills of costs detailing 
dozens to hundreds of cost items and interest amounts, calculated in various 
indeterminate ways. The debtor is then left having to sort through volumes of 
information requiring some complicated analysis157 to attempt to separate the 
lawful from the unlawful. Often the debtor will not have the requisite skill 
and knowledge available to do this. This concern is exasperated by the legal 
uncertainty with regard to exactly what costs and interest rates are allowed 
to be included in these matters. One case study is presented to illustrate the 
problem. 
During April 2016, one Mr C,158 who had purchased food on credit for R1 
404 during 2008, approached the Clinic. In 2009, an EAO was issued against 
Mr C as a result of an acknowledgement of debt which he had allegedly signed 
during 2008. When Mr C enquired about the balance of his debt in April 2016, 
the creditor’s attorney promptly informed his employer to cancel the order as 
the debt had been paid in full. At that time, even on the creditor’s version of 
events (which is disputed), an amount of R7 030 had already been collected 
from the debtor, more than five times the original debt.159 One shudders to 
think how much more would have been collected had the enquiry not been 
made at that stage. When the relevant collection attorney was requested to 
provide a detailed breakdown of the transaction, it forwarded a four-page 
statement stipulating cost items like correspondence, telephone calls and 
attendances, which had been added to the capital amount in justifying the 
amount collected. The costs indicated in the statement, almost R6 000, failed 
to add up to the totals reflected therein. Some of these costs were incurred prior 
to the judgment and EAO, but most thereafter. There was also no indication 
of the amount or rate of interest that had been charged against the debtor. 
Should unverified, unilaterally charged legal costs be allowed to be added to 
the debtor’s burden? What amount should, legally, be recoverable from the 
debtor in circumstances like this? 
The NCA normally applies to the types of transactions under discussion in 
this article.160 When this is the case, section 101 of the Act defines the items 
that can be charged as cost of credit, in other words the principal debt, interest 
and various fees and costs, which the credit provider can recover from the 
156 See Van der Merwe (2008) JJS 76 n 19.
157 For example, keeping track of interest rates and calculations.
158 Acronym used for a Law Clinic client, file on record with author.
159 The debtor alleges that more than R7800 has been paid to the creditor in this case.
160 See s 4 of the NCA. A full discussion of the application of the relevant Act falls outside the scope of this 
article.
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consumer in terms of an EAO.161 These items include “default administration 
charges” and “collection costs”.162 Section 1 of the NCA defines “collection 
costs” as “an amount that may be charged by a credit provider in respect of 
enforcement of a consumer’s monetary obligations under a credit agreement”. 
In addition, section 103(5) of the NCA provides as follows:
“Despite any provision of the common law or a credit agreement to the contrary, the amounts 
contemplated in section 101(1)(b) to (g) that accrue during the time that a consumer is in default under 
the credit agreement may not, in aggregate, exceed the unpaid balance of the principal debt under that 
credit agreement as at the time that the default occurs.”
There still seems to be a divergence about the accurate interpretation of 
section 103(5) of the NCA, despite the judgment of Du Plessis J in National 
Credit Regulator v Nedbank Limited.163 In this case, the court issued a 
declaratory order in respect of section 103(5),164 which clearly vindicates the 
application of what has been called the “statutory in duplum rule”.165 On a 
strict interpretation of the NCA and the Du Plessis J judgment, the creditor 
would only be able to collect a total amount of R2 808 in Mr C’s case, including 
interest and legal costs.166 The amount collected in addition to this amount 
should thus be repaid to the debtor. The opposing argument, as generally 
advanced on behalf of creditors, is that the costs, which are limited by the 
operation of sections 101 and 103 of the NCA, only include the “in-house soft 
collection costs” incurred to collect the debt.167 They argue that it does not 
include the “collateral procedural costs of judgment” in terms of taxed bills 
of costs awarded after judgment.168 On this interpretation, creditors and their 
attorneys would be able to supplement the debtor’s liability in terms of section 
101 and 103 of the NCA with the legal costs incurred through the rendering of 
professional legal services. 
161 Section 101.
162 Section 101(1)(f) and (g).
163 2009 6 SA 295 (GNP). The declaratory order was later confirmed on appeal in Nedbank Ltd v The 
National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA). 
164 The order reads as follows: 
“On a proper interpretation of section 103(5) read with section 101 (1)(b) to (g) of the National Credit 
Act, 2005:
1.  the amounts contemplated in sections 101(1)(b) to (g) which accrue while the consumer is in default 
may not exceed, in aggregate, the unpaid balance of the principal debt when the default occurred;
2.  once the total charges referred to in section 101(1 )(b) to (g) equal the amount of the unpaid balance, 
no further charges may be levied;
once the total charges referred to in sections 101 (1)(b) to (g) equal the amount of the unpaid balance, 
payments made by a consumer thereafter during a period of default do not have the effect of permitting 
the credit provider to charge further interest while such default persists.”
165 See, eg, M Kelly-Louw “Better Consumer Protection under the Statutory in duplum Rule” (2007) 19 SA 
Merc LJ 337.
166 340. 
167 This argument has been put forward in the Opposing Affidavit of the seventeenth respondent in the sub 
judice case of Lonmin Ltd v CG Steyn Inc T/A Steyn Attorneys NWHC case no M619/2016 of 26 April 
2018. See para 8.52.1 available at <https://www.adraonline.co.za/file/58c91eb475c96/law-society-of-the-
northen-province-opposing-affidavit.pdf> (accessed 16-03-2018). 
168 Para 8.53.
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In January 2015, The National Credit Regulator introduced proposed 
guidelines for the interpretation of section 103(5) of the NCA.169 In this 
circular, the Regulator avers that the definition of collection costs in terms of 
the NCA is wide enough to cover legal fees incurred in collecting the debt, 
which should then fall under the ambit of the section 103(5) limitation.170 The 
Regulator is however of the opinion that once judgment is granted against the 
debtor, interest starts running anew on the judgment amount at the interest rate 
ordered by court.171 Noticeably, no mention is made of whether this guideline 
applies mutatis mutandis to legal costs. One could argue that the failure of the 
Regulator to specify that legal costs also revive when judgment is awarded, is 
indicative of its opinion that, in fact, it does not. 
Some clarity on this issue could come from an intriguing avenue in the 
near future. During November 2016, the North West High Court issued an 
application by Lonmin Ltd, Anglo American Platinum Ltd, the Minister of 
Finance and Q-Link (Pty) Ltd in the sub judice case of Lonmin Ltd v CG 
Steyn Inc t/a Steyn Attorneys.172 In this case, the applicants have approached 
the court seeking, for the sake of the “wellbeing” of their employees,173 a 
declaratory order to confirm that 
“[c]ollection cost, as referred to in Section 101(1)(g), as defined in Section 1 and as applied in 
Section 103(5) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“the NCA”), includes all legal fees incurred 
by the credit provider to enforce the credit agreement and specifically includes fees for attorneys and 
advocates (where used) charged before as well as during litigation.”174 
The applicants also want the court to declare that section 103(5) of the NCA 
is applicable from the date of default to date of final settlement of the debt, 
regardless of whether or not a judgment was awarded.175 In addition, the court 
is requested to order extra judicial oversight in the EAO process, specifically 
aimed at the veracity of costs and fees levied on the matter.176 The respondents 
have opposed the matter and arguments for both parties were presented during 
March 2018. At the time of writing of this article, judgment is pending in the 
matter.177 
Mr C’s case is only one of several similar cases that the Clinic deals with 
on a regular basis. Many indigent members of society rely on organisations 
like the Clinic to recover money illegally misappropriated from them, and 
169 National Credit Regulator “Circular no. 03 of 2015 – Proposed guidelines for the interpretation and 
application of section 103(5) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (01-2015) The National Credit 
Regulator <https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/circulars/jan2015/Circular%203%20of%202015% 
20-%20Section%20103(5)%20-%20Proposed%20Guidelines.pdf.> (accessed 16-03-2018). 
170 Paras 4.4 and 4.5.
171 Para 4.6.
172 NWHC case no M619/2016 of 26 April 2018. For copies of the applicant’s pleadings, see Notice of 
Motion available at <http://www.adraonline.co.za/file/583695c27f294/1-notice-of-motion.pdf> (accessed 
16-03-2018); Found Affidavit part 1 available at <http://www.adraonline.co.za/file/5836964d06f27/2-
founding-affidavit-part-1.pdf> (accessed 16-03-2018); and Founding Affidavit part 2 available at <http://
www.adraonline.co.za/file/583696e8f1970/3-founding-affidavit-part-2.pdf> (accessed 16-3-2018). 
173 Lonmin Ltd v CG Steyn Inc T/A Steyn Attorneys NWHC case no M619/2016 of 26 April 2018 para 92 of the 
applicant’s Founding Affidavit.
174 See prayer 4.1 of applicant’s Notice of Motion. 
175 See prayer 4.2 of applicant’s Notice of Motion.
176 See prayer 4.3 of applicant’s Notice of Motion.
177 Update: The judgment was since handed down and appealed, which appeal was dismissed with costs. 
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this is also the case when they are victimised by unscrupulous lenders. It 
remains to be seen what the full impact of the amendments in store for the 
MCA will be. The important role-players in the EAO legal landscape will 
be tasked with interpreting and applying these within the existing legislative 
framework. One should be hopeful that the judicial and legislative influence 
of the past few years will contribute to dismantling the negative image of 
exploitation associated with the South African credit industry,178 and bring 
about reasonable and fair opportunities for all concerned.
 SUMMARY
The South African Constitutional Court delivered a landmark judgment in relation to emolument 
attachment orders (“EAOs”) in its 2016 ruling of University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v Clinic; 
Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v Clinic. The court confirmed that EAOs were frequently obtained 
unlawfully and in circumstances where debtors’ constitutional rights and freedoms were completely 
disregarded. The judgment followed on decades of legal disputes between creditors, abetted by their 
collection agents, and debtors, represented by organisations like the University of Stellenbosch Law 
Clinic. Following this judgment, legislation has been enacted to address some of the more pertinent 
frailties in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (“MCA”) in order to provide for more robust judicial 
oversight in the granting of EAOs. This article offers a unique perspective on the background that 
merited this significant judicial and legislative intervention. It then considers the significance and 
impact of the judgment and impending law reform, and evaluates whether the enactment of the Courts 
of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017 (“CLA”) addresses all the relevant concerns. It is suggested that 
uncertainty still remains regarding EAOs granted before the judgment, as well as with regard to the 
recovery of illegally deducted amounts. 
178 See, eg, H Coetzee & M Roestoff “Consumer debt relief in South-Africa – Should the insolvency system 
provide for NINA debtors? Lessons from New Zealand” (2013) 22 3 Int Insol Rev 188 where the authors 
state that “despite international trends to accommodate overburdened debtors, South Africa has yet to 
provide adequate relief to debtors and the law remains largely creditor orientated.“
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